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relies on mirror neurons (see Does Motor System Activation During 
Language Understanding Entail Mirror Neurons?). Second, what 
is the evidence that activity in sensori-motor cortices plays a func-
tional role in understanding language (see Activation of Sensori-
Motor Cortices: Functional or Epiphenomenal?). Third, to what 
extent do responses in perceptual and motor areas depend on the 
linguistic and extra-linguistic context (see Context-Dependence 
of Sensori-Motor Cortex Activation During Language Processing). 
And finally, can embodied theories accommodate language about 
abstract concepts (see Processing Non-Literal Language).
EmbodiEd languagE undErstanding
What does it mean for language to be “embodied”? Embodied cog-
nition is understood in various ways, making more or less radi-
cal claims about how cognition, perception, and action interact. 
Proposals range from attributing some role for perception and 
action systems in grounding cognition (Barsalou, 2008) to extend-
ing the human mind to include parts of the environment (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998; see Wilson, 2002 for discussion), leading Anderson 
(2008) to conclude that “in fact there are nearly as many theories 
of [embodied] grounding – what it is, and what it means – as there 
are theorists” (Anderson, 2008, p. 423, our addition).
What unites the seemingly disparate notions of embodied cog-
nition is what they argue against. Here we narrow our scope to 
the study of linguistic meaning, or embodied semantics. Theories 
of embodied semantics argue against semantic representations 
as purely amodal and symbolic in nature, such as the symbols 
introduction
Do people use parts of the brain involved in perception and action to 
understand language? The idea that meaning is grounded in percep-
tuo-motor states, which traces its origins at least to the philosophy 
of Aristotle (De Anima, Book II–III), flourished in the writings of 
the British Empiricists (e.g., Locke, 1690/1979). In the twenty-first 
century, this proposal has been reborn in the context of theories of 
embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Prinz, 2002; Anderson, 
2003; Zwaan, 2004; Pulvermuller, 2005; Feldman, 2006; Gibbs, 2006). 
One difference between the current incarnation of this ancient idea 
and its previous instantiations is that scientists now have tools to test 
it in unprecedented ways, probing how the neural substrates of lan-
guage and thought relate to neural systems for perception and action.
Here we review neurocognitive studies of language embodiment 
in healthy adults and evaluate their possible contributions to theories 
of linguistic meaning. We start out by sketching the minimal predic-
tions that an embodied theory of language understanding makes for 
empirical research (see Embodied Language Understanding). We 
then survey cognitive neuroscience studies that have been offered 
as evidence for embodied semantic representations (see Neural 
Investigations of Embodied Language Understanding), and explore 
four debated issues. First, does activation of sensori-motor cortices1 
during action language  understanding imply that action semantics 
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 manipulated by a Turing machine2. Put more positively: Embodied 
cognition argues that meaning is grounded in our interactions with 
the world, and that this grounding is reflected in a concept’s neu-
ral representation. On embodied accounts, when people under-
stand language about perception and action they use parts of our 
brain that are also involved in perception and action. On another 
assumption shared by embodied semantic theories, neural systems 
that support perception and action also play a functional role in 
language processing. Sensori-motor cortex activation is not epi-
phenomenal, nor is it a down-stream consequence of processing 
language that triggers explicit perceptual or motor imagery. To 
summarize, the minimal predictions of an embodied theory of 
language understanding are that: (a) parts of our action and per-
ception systems are involved in language understanding, and (b) 
this involvement is functional, constituting or contributing to the 
construction of meaning.
The embodied framework is closely related to the theory of 
distributed semantics, as formulated by Allport (1985; see Saffran 
and Scholl, 1999). According to Allport (1985), semantic represen-
tations are distributed along the perceptual features of concepts. 
For instance, color words would be partially represented by parts 
of the visual system involved in color perception, nouns describing 
objects would be partially represented by the visual system involved 
in perceiving objects, etc. On embodied theories, semantic content 
is distributed over modality-specific systems because concepts are 
at least partly constituted by mental simulations of our physical 
interactions with the world.
Our review will focus on results from experiments that use func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), event-related potentials 
(ERPs) derived from electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoen-
cephalography (MEG), and transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS). We will also focus on language understanding rather than 
language production, since at present the great majority of the 
available data test predictions about neural activity in comprehend-
ers (in part due to the technical challenges of studying the neural 
correlates of language production).
We acknowledge that there is a rich literature on embodied 
language understanding using behavioral techniques (see e.g., 
Glenberg, 2007; Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan 
and Kaschak, 2008 for review). Although relevant, these studies lie 
beyond the scope of this review. The central claim of embodied 
semantics concerns the functional activation of neural systems for 
perception and action during language use. We will therefore focus 
on neural data, which bear on this claim most directly.
nEural invEstigations of EmbodiEd languagE 
undErstanding
action-rElatEd languagE
In one line of research, researchers have used the somatotopic rep-
resentation of movements performed with different effectors in the 
motor system to study the neural correlates of semantics (see Jirak 
et al., 2010 for review). Somatotopy means that neighboring parts 
of motor cortex are involved in movement of particular effectors 
such as the hands, feet, tongue, etc., (Woolsey, 1963; Woolsey et al., 
1979; but see Graziano and Aflalo, 2007 for a modern perspec-
tive). The strategy has been to test whether understanding action-
related language leads to somatotopic activation of motor areas. For 
instance, in one fMRI study subjects read verbs describing actions 
performed with the feet, hands, or face (e.g., “kick,” “pick,” “lick”; 
Hauk et al., 2004). Motor production areas were mapped by  having 
participants move their foot, finger, or tongue. Reading action verbs 
led to a similar pattern of activation in premotor cortex as actu-
ally moving the effectors for two of the three effectors (the hands 
and the feet).
Tettamanti et al. (2005) similarly showed somatotopy in response 
to sentence comprehension. Participants listened to action-related 
sentences (“I bite an apple”) and abstract sentences (“I appreci-
ate sincerity”). The action sentences included three types: those 
describing mouth actions (“I bite an apple”), hand actions (“I grasp 
the knife”), or leg actions (“I kick the ball”). All action sentences 
activated left inferior frontal cortex more strongly than abstract 
sentences did. Moreover, sentences describing actions with differ-
ent effectors activated the premotor cortex in an effector-specific 
manner (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006).
Postle et al. (2008) did not replicate the somatotopic activation 
pattern in premotor cortex in response to the reading of hand, 
foot or mouth verbs found in other studies. They speculated that 
this may have been due to the fact that their control stimuli were 
concrete nouns (e.g., “moon,” “hill”) with similar levels of image-
ability as the action verbs, whereas in some previous studies hash 
marks or abstract words/sentences were used as baseline. However, a 
study from our group showed effector-specific premotor activation 
in hand areas even though the stimuli we contrasted were matched 
for imageability, along with other psycholinguistic factors (Willems 
et al., 2010b). For now it is unclear why Postle and colleagues did 
not observe an effector-specific activation of premotor cortex in 
response to action verbs.
One factor that could give rise to discrepant findings across 
action verb studies is the method of analysis. Creating subject-
specific regions of interest in motor areas appears to be a more 
powerful analysis strategy than employing whole brain analysis or 
using regions of interest at the group level (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; 
Willems et al., 2010b,c). Studies show that, across participants, there 
is considerable variation in the exact location of premotor activa-
tion during action verb reading (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Kemmerer 
and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2008; Fernandino and Iacoboni, 2010; Jirak 
et al., 2010; Willems et al., 2010b,c). This variation might lead to 
null-findings after averaging at the group level.
Action-related nouns have been found to activate motor areas, as 
well as verbs. An experiment by Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) shows 
that the amount of action associated with an object word drives 
activation of the motor system during word reading. Participants 
performed a lexical decision task while they read words denoting 
objects such as “bookend,” “clock,” “cup,” and “hammer.” These 
words differ in how much action is needed to use the object effec-
tively. Although they are all concrete, manipulable objects, one does 
not need to actively manipulate a bookend or a clock in order to 
use it. This is different for a cup or a hammer, which one needs to 
manipulate to use them effectively. This distinction was reflected in 
2A young Alan Turing interestingly foreshadowed this disembodied perspective: “As 
regards the question of why we have bodies at all; why we do not or cannot live free 
as spirits and communicate as such, we probably could do so but there would be 
nothing whatever to do. The body provides something for the spirit to look after 
and use.” (in Hodges, 1983, p. 64).
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How might one’s own action experience influence the neural 
correlates of action language understanding? Willems et al. (2010b) 
investigated whether premotor cortex activation in response to 
action verbs is body-specific (Casasanto, 2009), meaning that acti-
vation should be different for individuals who habitually perform 
actions differently. We measured brain activation (with fMRI) in 
healthy left- and right-handed participants during a lexical decision 
task. Participants read verbs that name hand actions (“to throw”) 
and verbs that name actions performed with other effectors (“to 
kneel”). Right- and left-handers showed contrasting patterns of 
activity in cortical motor regions when reading manual action 
verbs like grasp and throw, as compared to reading non-manual 
action verbs. Each group preferentially activated premotor areas 
in the hemisphere contralateral to their dominant hand: the hand 
they would normally use to perform the actions named by the 
manual action verbs. Understanding an action verb involves cre-
ating a representation of how the comprehender would perform 
the action with his or her own body (see also Beilock et al., 2008; 
Lyons et al., 2010).
It appears that the way people act in the world influences their 
semantic representations (see also Aglioti et al., 2008). However, 
people can also understand language about actions they have never 
performed. This creates a potential tension between embodiment 
and abstraction. We suggest that although some constituents of 
word meaning are body-specific, it is likely that other constituents 
are abstracted away from people’s physical experiences. It remains 
an open question whether people can understand words referring to 
actions they have never performed as completely as they understand 
words for actions they have performed themselves.
doEs motor systEm activation during languagE 
undErstanding Entail mirror nEurons?
Discussions of motor simulation and embodiment often invoke 
mirror neurons. Motor mirror neurons, which have been observed 
directly in monkeys, fire both when an animal performs an action 
and when it observes the same action (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Do human mirror neurons – if 
they exist in the human – contribute to language understanding? 
According to Glenberg et al. (2008b):
The mirror neuron system has been implicated in the understanding 
of language. […] Thus, observed actions are understood by engaging 
in motor simulation, and language about actions is understood by 
engaging in a substantially similar type of activity. An important 
fact supporting this interpretation is that a part of the human mir-
ror neuron system is located in Broca’s area which has long been 
associated with language. (p. 917)
Invoking mirror neurons here is potentially misleading, for two 
reasons (see also Hickok, 2009; Turella et al., 2009). First, it gives 
the impression that the specific “mirroring” properties of mirror 
neurons are needed to support the modality-specific simulation 
postulated by embodied theories. But mirroring (i.e., firing simi-
larly during action observation and execution) is not required for 
cells involved in action execution to be reused during language 
comprehension. As an analogy, consider the proposal that we reuse 
visual areas during visual imagery. Does it follow from this that cells 
in visual cortex have mirror neuron-like properties? It is sufficient 
increased activation levels in premotor and inferior parietal cortex, 
areas known to be involved in action and object use (see Beauchamp 
and Martin, 2007; Martin, 2007 for an overview of conceptual rep-
resentations of objects).
In studies by Kable et al. (2002, 2005), participants performed 
a semantic matching task on triads of pictures or words describ-
ing action or objects. In one of these studies increased activity 
to action words was observed in the motor cortex just as in the 
studies described above (Kable et al., 2005). However, additionally, 
increased activation was found in the vicinity of human motion 
area MT when subjects had to judge actions compared to when 
they had to judge objects (Kable et al., 2002, 2005). The finding 
that motion areas are activated during action word understanding 
is in line with results from Kemmerer et al. (2008) who replicated 
the somatotopic activation in response to action verbs in premotor 
cortex. Moreover they showed that different verbs which share the 
semantic feature “ACTION” all activate premotor structures and 
that verbs sharing the semantic feature “MOTION” consistently 
activated more posterior areas known to be involved in move-
ment processing (see Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2008 for 
discussion). This indicates that in addition to motor properties, 
perceptual (visual) properties can also be activated when process-
ing language.
Similarly, Saygin et al. (2010) observed increased BOLD levels 
in motion sensitive area MT when participants read sentences 
like “The wild horse crossed the barren field” versus “The black 
horse stood in the barren field” (see also Desai et al., 2010). In 
contrast, Bedny et al. (2008) did not observe sensitivity of area 
MT to amount of implied motion in nouns or verbs. Participants 
judged pairs of words which implied motion (animals, e.g., “the 
horse” and “the dog”), had intermediate implied motion (tools, 
e.g., “the sword,” “the axe”), or had little implied motion (natural 
kinds, e.g., “the bush,” “the pebble”). The main finding was that 
motion area MT was not sensitive to this parametric variation. 
An area slightly more anterior to the visual motion area did show 
such sensitivity. But because this area was not activated in a motion 
localizer, this neighboring activity cannot be interpreted as support 
for the hypothesis that understanding motion language reuses 
brain areas involved in motion perception (see Simmons, et al., 
2007 for discussion). It is not clear, however, to what extent the 
lack of overlap between activation during the localizer task and 
language task in the Bedny et al. (2008) data should be interpreted 
as evidence against embodied semantics, and to what extent these 
data simply show a mismatch in the neurocognitive demands of 
the two tasks. In principle, two different motion perception tasks 
could also activate non-overlapping cortical regions in or around 
MT. In defense of the Bedny et al. (2008) interpretation it should 
be noted that also posterior superior temporal sulcus did not show 
sensitivity to the amount of implied motion expressed by the verbs. 
Superior temporal sulcus is believed to respond rather invariantly 
to biological motion (e.g., Grossman et al., 2010). There may be 
a simple explanation for the contradictory findings from Bedny 
et al. (2008) and Saygin et al. (2010). Participants in the Saygin 
et al. (2010) study were presented with full sentences describing 
motion scenes, which may have cued them to create richer mental 
models than participants in the Bedny et al. (2008) study, who 
judged de-contextualized pairs of words.
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Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2008) performed an fMRI study in which 
participants listened to sentences related to faces (e.g., “The farmer 
has freckles on his cheeks”) or related to places (e.g., “The house has 
a couch near the fireplace”). Previous research indicates that see-
ing faces and places elicits activation increases in confined parts of 
cortex, often labeled fusiform face area (FFA) and parahippocampal 
place area (PPA), respectively (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Aguirre et al., 
1998; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein et al., 1999). Aziz-Zadeh 
et al. (2008) localized FFA and PPA in their participants using a 
perceptual task and subsequently looked at activation in these areas 
during listening to face- and place-related sentences. Face-related 
sentences selectively modulated FFA  activity, and  place-related 
 sentences PPA activity. Somewhat surprisingly, however, this modu-
lation was present in the form of a decrease to sentences of the 
type the extrastriate area was sensitive to: FFA was less activated 
by face-related sentences as compared to place-related sentences, 
and vice versa for PPA. This effect was only observed in the left 
hemisphere and only to sentences involving famous people or places 
(e.g., “George Bush has wrinkles around his eyes” and “The Taj 
Mahal faces a long thin reflecting pool”).
In a related study, Landau et al. (2010) presented participants 
with the same place- and face-sentences, which were now followed 
by the picture of a face. EEG was measured and time locked to the 
presentation of the face picture. Interestingly, it was found that the 
face-sensitive ERP component N170 to a face preceded by a face-
related sentence, was larger compared to faces that were preceded 
by a place-related sentence. On the contrary, priming a face picture 
by another face picture (visual–visual priming), instead led to a 
decreased N170 amplitude. In short this study shows that linguistic 
priming leads to an opposite amplitude modulation of the N170 
as compared to visual priming.
The decreased BOLD activations (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2008), and 
opposite amplitude modulations of the ERP (Landau et al., 2010) 
are explained as resulting from inhibition of content-specific infor-
mation during language understanding, at least partially in order to 
prevent interference from the actual perceptual content. The idea 
is that when we talk with someone face-to-face, activating a face 
representation in response to language about faces may interfere 
with our perception of our speech partner’s face, and that hence 
listening to language about faces leads to suppression of activity 
in the FFA.
This explanation may be correct, but it is somewhat surpris-
ing that suppression would persist even when comprehenders are 
alone, lying in the scanner, not talking with anyone. Furthermore, 
an embodied theory of language such as Pulvermuller’s (2005) 
clearly predicts language-related activation in FFA and PPA; not 
suppression. Still, a skeptic who wished to interpret Aziz-Zadeh 
et al.’s (2008) data as evidence against an embodied theory would 
be obligated to explain why content-specific perceptual areas were 
selectively modulated by linguistic stimuli, at all.
sEction summary
Together, these studies provide evidence that parts of the cortical 
motor and perceptual systems can be activated (or deactivated) 
during language understanding, although it should be noted that 
this modulation is not always observed. Moreover, they show that 
this activation can be selective. Verbs naming actions performed 
to posit that visual imagery reuses parts of the brain involved in 
visual perception, and analogously, that action language under-
standing reuses parts of the brain involved in performing actions.
Second, bringing in mirror neurons seems to put special 
emphasis on the coupling between language and the motor system. 
Although the motor system appears to have special significance 
for understanding language about actions, there may be noth-
ing special about the role of the motor system in  understanding 
language, in general (see also Willems and Hagoort, 2007; cf. 
Corballis, 2003; Arbib, 2005). As is evident from Sections “Does 
Motor System Activation During Language Understanding Entail 
Mirror Neurons?” and “Perceptual Language” of this review, the 
data relevant to embodied theories of semantics come primarily 
from studies of the motor system, and secondarily, of the visual 
system. But these neural systems have no special status theoreti-
cally; in principle, modality-specific simulation should contribute 
to comprehension of language about any sensory, motor, or affec-
tive state (see Barsalou, 2008).
PErcEPtual languagE
Does language understanding also involve activations of perceptual 
areas when the semantic content includes perceptible features? This 
was tested in an fMRI study by Simmons et al. (2007) in which par-
ticipants were presented with written words (e.g., “eggplant”) which 
would be followed by a color word depicting either the typical color 
of the object (e.g., “purple”) or an atypical color (Simmons et al., 
2007). On control trials, an object-word (e.g., “screwdriver”) would 
be followed by a motor property (e.g., “turning”). Participants’ task 
was to respond as quickly as possible to the color/motor word, indi-
cating whether it described an actual property of the object named 
by the first word. Color sensitive areas in extrastriate cortex were 
localized using a perceptual color task. The main finding was that 
parts of extrastriate cortex sensitive to color perception were also 
more strongly activated when participants judged a word’s color 
property, as compared to when they judged a motor property3.
Moscoso del Prado Martin et al. (2006) measured EEG while 
participants passively read color-related words, form-related words, 
or non-words. They observed that ERP responses to words started 
to differ from non-words around 150 ms after stimulus presenta-
tion. ERPs for color-related words and form-related words differed 
later, around 200 ms. The neural generators of the ERP effects 
were localized using minimum norm current estimates. The word 
versus non-word difference localized mainly to left fusiform gyrus, 
perhaps corresponding to the “visual word form area” (Cohen et al., 
2002). The color-related versus form-related words difference local-
ized to left middle temporal gyrus, whereas the difference between 
form-related and color-related words peaked in left anterior frontal 
areas. The authors interpret the difference in localization of form- 
and color-related words to differences in the processing of color 
and form. This conclusion should be taken with caution though, 
since the areas activated during word processing were not the par-
ticular extrastriate areas that are usually involved in processing 
color and form.
3Note that the dorso-medial of the brain including motor areas was not covered 
during scanning. Hence it was not possible to investigate the response in the motor 
system to words in the motor property task (e.g., “screwdriver”).
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In another effort to establish the functional significance of 
modality-specific activity, Hauk et al. (2008) looked at how lexical 
frequency influenced neural processing of action-related words 
(e.g., “kick”) and vision-related words (e.g., “sun”). By their rea-
soning, parametric variation of activity in motor and visual areas 
with the lexical frequency of motor and visual words would be 
indicative of lexico-semantic processing: not strategic task-related 
responding or explicit imagery. Furthermore, they reasoned that 
observing separable effects of frequency for action- and visual-
words in motor and visual areas, respectively, would provide evi-
dence of modality-specific lexical representations. The main finding 
was a correlation of lexical frequency for visually related words 
with activation in left fusiform gyrus and of lexical frequency for 
 action-related words with activation in left middle temporal gyrus. 
This was interpreted as reflecting “true” lexico-semantic processing 
and not epiphenomenal or down-stream activation. While com-
pelling in their specificity, these data are, once again, equivocal 
with respect to the functional significance of activation in visual 
and motor areas cued by language; these correlational data do not 
establish any causal role for modality-specific activity in the con-
struction of linguistic meaning.
Researchers have used TMS to investigate a causal role for 
motor cortex activation in understanding action-related language. 
In one study, hand/arm and leg words were presented while stimu-
lating the “hand/arm area” and “leg area” of the motor cortex 
(Pulvermuller et al., 2005a). Stimulation was single-pulse TMS 
and subjects’ task was to make a lexical decision to the visually 
presented words. Reponses to target words were given by means 
of a mouth movement. Faster reaction times were observed to 
hand/arm words after stimulation of the “hand/arm area” as 
well as to leg words after stimulation of the “leg area.” Papeo 
et al. (2009) tried to replicate this finding using a more elaborate 
stimulation scheme, applying TMS pulses at several time points 
after verb presentation. The main finding was that hand motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs) were increased to reading of action 
verbs when TMS was applied 500 ms after stimulus presentation, 
but not when TMS was applied 170 and 340 ms after stimulus 
presentation. The finding that only the latest post-stimulus TMS 
stimulation increased MEPs makes it difficult to interpret the 
MEPs Papeo et al. (2009) observed as evidence that cortical motor 
areas play a role in language understanding, per se; the timing of 
the N400 ERP component suggests that important aspects of word 
meaning are typically computed in less than 500 ms. Moreover, 
the MEP increases were only present when Papeo et al. (2009) 
participants performed a semantic categorization task, but not 
during a syllabic categorization task. This raises the question of 
how automatically (pre)motor representations are constructed in 
response to action verbs, a question we will return to in Section 
“Context-Dependence of Sensori-Motor Cortex Activation 
During Language Processing.”
Further complicating interpretation of these TMS data, Buccino 
et al. (2005) found a pattern of results opposite to the pattern 
found in the studies described above, using a similar paradigm. 
Participants passively listened to sentences describing leg and arm 
actions, while the leg/foot and arm areas of motor cortex were 
stimulated with single-pulse TMS. MEPs were recorded from the 
participants’ hands and feet. The main finding was that single-pulse 
with a certain effector elicit activation in the areas involved in using 
that effector. This effector-specific activation also reflects the way 
comprehenders tend to perform actions with their particular 
bodies. Likewise, assessing the color properties of words activates 
visual areas involved in color perception, whereas understanding 
sentences about faces and places modulates activity in face- and 
place-specific visual areas.
Results like these have been interpreted as evidence for an 
embodied view of language understanding (e.g., Gallese and 
Lakoff, 2005; Feldman, 2006; Glenberg, 2007). Classical models 
of language in the brain primarily include peri-sylvian “language 
areas,” and do not predict that perceptual and motor areas should 
be involved in language understanding (Cutler and Clifton, 1999; 
Levelt, 1999; Perfetti, 1999). The research that we reviewed is teach-
ing us something new, but from the studies reviewed so far it is 
not clear what lesson we should take away. In showing involve-
ment of modality-specific perceptuo-motor areas during language 
comprehension, these studies satisfy the first minimal requirement 
of embodied semantics that we suggested above (see Embodied 
Language Understanding), but they do not address the second: 
how do we know the observed activation plays any functional role 
in language understanding?
activation of sEnsori-motor corticEs: functional or 
EPiPhEnomEnal?
The data reviewed above are consistent with embodied theories of 
semantics, but these data could also be explained by a traditional 
amodal view of meaning. Modality-specific activation could be a 
down-stream consequences of “true” language processing (Mahon 
and Caramazza, 2008). For example, upon reading a verb like “to 
throw,” the amodal semantic representation of the verb is activated 
in the mental lexicon, corresponding to activation in left temporal 
lobe (see Indefrey and Levelt, 2004; Indefrey and Cutler, 2005). 
Activating this amodal representation leads to a cascade of spread-
ing activation, and may cue the generation of an explicit motor 
image of throwing (see also Weiskopf, 2010). On this account, the 
activations in premotor cortex do not contribute to language under-
standing; they result from it.
To address this skeptical possibility, some researchers have 
attempted to establish the functional significance of modality-
specific activity by showing how rapidly it is cued by language. 
MEG and EEG studies show that differences between leg, arm or 
face words emerge around 200 ms (Hauk and Pulvermuller, 2004; 
Pulvermuller et al., 2005b). Results showed a dissociation between 
leg words in dorsal premotor cortex and arm and face words in more 
ventral premotor regions, consistent with the expected somatotopy. 
The authors argue that the latency of this effect is too fast to be 
explainable in terms of general strategic effects or post-comprehen-
sion mental imagery, and must therefore be part of the semantic 
representation of the word. Indeed, such rapidity argues against 
interpreting this language-related premotor activity as a down-
stream consequence of explicit imagery (Farah, 1989). However, 
these data do not speak to the functional significance of this activity 
for meaning construction: not without a host of assumptions about 
information flow within and between neural systems that may be 
difficult to substantiate (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Willems 
et al., 2010c).
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tal imagery. TMS and patient-based studies provide initial evidence 
that motor cortex activation plays some causal role in understanding 
action-related language, but the available evidence does not support 
strong conclusions, in particular since TMS can lead to faster as well 
as slower reaction times in seemingly comparable experimental situ-
ations. (See also Processing Non-Literal Language for discussion of a 
behavioral study by Glenberg et al. (2008a) that provides evidence that 
motor representations play a causal role in language understanding).
contExt-dEPEndEncE of sEnsori-motor cortEx 
activation during languagE ProcEssing
How automatically are sensori-motor cortices activated when peo-
ple understand language about perception and action? According 
to some proposals, word forms are linked to (somatotopic) rep-
resentations in sensori-motor cortices via Hebbian cell assem-
blies (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Pulvermuller, 2005). On the most 
extreme view, activation of motor cortex in response to action 
words is reflexive: merely perceiving a spoken or written word like 
“grasp” should activate cortical areas involved in planning and 
executing actions, even if the perceiver is not attending to the word 
(see Pulvermuller, 2005, p. 578; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Although 
some studies suggest that sensori-motor areas are activated by 
language highly automatically (e.g., Hauk and Pulvermuller, 2004; 
Pulvermuller et al., 2005b), the majority of studies suggest that 
modality-specific activation depends on the context – linguistic 
and extra-linguistic – in which words referring to precepts and 
actions occur.
Experimental task appears to influence how motor cortex 
responds to action-related language. Sato et al. (2008) found that 
hand-action verbs interfered with button presses, but only when 
participants performed an explicit semantic judgment task, not 
during lexical decision. A similar task effect was observed by Papeo 
et al. (2009), who found modulation of hand MEPs during reading 
of hand-action verbs when single-pulse TMS was applied only dur-
ing an explicit semantic categorization task (“Is this word action-
related or not?”, but not during a syllable detection task (“How 
many syllables are there in this word?”). Some studies show effector-
specific activity even during tasks with shallow processing demands, 
such as lexical decisions on action verbs (e.g., Willems et al., 2010b), 
but in general tasks that require deeper “semantic-level” processing 
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972) are more likely to produce evidence of 
modality-specific simulation during language processing.
The linguistic context can also cause motor areas to respond dif-
ferently to the same action-related words. Tettamanti et al. (2008) 
showed that negation of actions modulates activation levels in 
premotor cortex. Participants read sentences like “Now I push the 
button” versus “Now I don’t push the button.” For comparison, they 
read sentences unrelated to concrete actions like “Now I appreci-
ate sincerity” and “Now I don’t appreciate sincerity.” The main 
finding was an interaction between sentence content (action ver-
sus no action) and negation (affirmative versus negative) in part 
of dorsal premotor cortex, with higher activation for affirmative 
action sentences compared to negative action sentences. In a further 
analysis of these data it was shown that connectivity between audi-
tory (temporal) and motor regions was increased during listening 
to action-related sentences, as compared to when listening to the 
more abstract sentences (Ghio and Tettamanti, 2010).
TMS led to decreased hand MEPs when participants were listening 
to hand-related sentences as compared to foot-related sentences, 
and vice versa. One notable difference across studies is the relative 
timing of stimulation. TMS pulses were delivered during reading 
in the Buccino et al. (2005) paper, 150 ms after word presentation 
in the Pulvermuller et al. (2005a) study, and at later time points in 
the Papeo et al. (2009) study.
A related technique to study the involvement of premotor cortex 
in action language understanding is theta burst TMS. Theta burst 
TMS modulates cortical activity in a targeted region for a rela-
tively short (up to 1 h) time (Huang et al., 2005). Willems et al. (in 
press) used this technique to modulate excitability of left or right 
premotor cortex of right-handed participants, who performed a 
lexical decision to manual and non-manual action verbs. The main 
 finding is that reaction times to manual and non-manual verbs were 
differentially modified by TMS over left, but not right premotor 
cortex. In particular, participants were faster to manual verbs after 
left premotor TMS than after right premotor TMS. Again, as in the 
discussion of single-pulse TMS studies, it is essentially unclear why 
theta burst TMS led to faster reaction times.
Together, these studies indicate there is some causal relationship 
between motor cortex activation and action verb processing, but 
based on the TMS results to date, this relationship remains unclear.
A few studies have tested for functional relationships between 
motor activity and action language processing in patients with motor 
system impairments. For example, Boulenger et al. (2008b) per-
formed a masked priming study in patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
a neurological condition that impacts the motor system. Compared 
to age-matched controls, Parkinson’s patients showed weaker masked 
priming effects for verbs compared to nouns. Strikingly, there was no 
verb–verb priming in patients who were off dopaminergic medica-
tion; when disease symptoms were strongest, patients showed no 
trace of verb–verb priming, yet noun–noun priming in these patients 
was similar to controls. There are several methodological issues that 
make these data less than straightforward to interpret (see Mahon 
and Caramazza, 2008 for discussion). Despite these limitations, how-
ever, this study suggests that impairment to the motor system may 
selectively impair processing action verbs.
Arevalo et al. (2010) found some effect of lesions in primary 
and premotor cortex on word–picture matching of actions, but the 
impairment was only observed for foot-related actions. Strikingly, 
no somatotopic relation between lesion site in the motor system 
and understanding of mouth, foot, or hand words was observed 
and the authors argue against a necessary role for motor cortex in 
understanding action concepts.
A complete overview of potentially relevant neuropsychological 
data is beyond the scope of this paper (see Saffran and Scholl, 1999; 
Gainotti, 2000; Mahon and Caramazza, 2009). For the current pur-
poses, we note that there are some indications that impairments to 
brain structures specialized for perception and motor action lead to 
corresponding problems in language understanding. Upon skeptical 
evaluation, however, these patient-based studies do not appear to be 
conclusive (see Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Arevalo et al., 2010).
In summary, EEG and MEG studies demonstrate that language can 
activate brain areas that subserve perception and action very rapidly, 
challenging the skeptical position that modality-specific activity is 
only an artifact of strategic responding or post-comprehension men-
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(Casasanto, 2008). Some of these studies show connections between 
bodily action and abstract mental states that may seem, at first, to 
directly support the claim that abstract concepts and word mean-
ings are embodied. For example, a study by Casasanto and Dijkstra 
(2010) shows that simple motor actions affect how people produce 
language with positive and negative emotional valence. Participants 
were asked to recount positive or negative autobiographical mem-
ories while moving marbles upward or downward between two 
cardboard boxes. In one experiment, participants were faster to 
tell positive memories while moving marbles up and  negative 
 memories while moving them down, consistent with linguistic 
metaphors for positive and negative emotions (e.g., “her spirits 
rose”; “her hopes fell”). In a second experiment, upward marble 
movements caused participants to recount more positive events and 
downward movements more negative events from their store of per-
sonal experiences. Beyond influencing how efficiently stories could 
be produced, irrelevant marble movements partly determined the 
emotional content of the memories participants retold.
Yet, it would be premature to interpret data like these as evidence 
that modality-specific simulations support abstract language and 
thought. Together, this body of behavioral data provides support for 
metaphor theory, showing for instance that people activate spatio-
motor representations when they talk and think about abstract 
domains. But evidence for metaphor theory is not necessarily evi-
dence for embodiment. Although these behavioral experiments 
show that some sort of spatio-motor representations contribute 
to abstract thoughts, they are not informative about the nature of 
these representations. In principle, motor actions could activate 
mental metaphors that consist of associative links between amodal 
representations in “source domains” like motion and space and 
“target domains” like emotion, similarity, or time (see Casasanto, 
2009, for discussion). Although behavioral data that support meta-
phor theory are consistent with embodied semantics, they are also 
consistent with disembodied alternatives.
In order to determine whether the spatio-motor components of 
metaphorical representations are embodied simulations, it is neces-
sary to test predictions about neural activity more directly. Several 
studies have investigated whether motor areas are activated when 
people understand non-literal uses of action language. They have 
produced mixed results, perhaps because these studies have tested a 
mixed bag of non-literal language: action metaphors, action idioms, 
and non-action verbs derived (diachronically) from action verbs.
Rueschemeyer et al. (2007) used fMRI to compare neural acti-
vation to action verbs and verbs that have an action verb as their 
stem, but do not have any action-related meaning (e.g., the German 
verbs “greifen” – to grasp – versus “begreifen” – to understand). In 
principle, there are two reasons why “begreifen” might activate parts 
of premotor cortex even though its meaning does not signal a literal 
action. First, this verb could be morphologically decomposed by 
the comprehender: the “greifen” in “begreifen” could be sufficient 
to activate motor areas. Second, “begreifen” could be understood as 
a metaphorical extension of literal grasping. Results showed that, 
compared to abstract verbs without action stems, the literal action 
verbs activated premotor areas, as in previous studies. By contrast, 
no premotor activation was found for verbs like “begreifen.” When 
action verbs function as stems for more complex non-action verbs, 
they do not appear to activate motor areas.
van Elk et al. (2010) manipulated whether an action men-
tioned in a sentence was performed by an animal or by a human. 
Participants read sentences like “The duck swims in the pond” ver-
sus “The woman swims in the pond,” during EEG measurements. 
A stronger decrease in power in the beta and mu frequency bands 
was observed in response to the verb (“swims”) when the action 
was performed by an animal compared to when it was performed 
by a human. The neural generators of these power differences were 
localized to primary and premotor cortex. Decreases in beta power 
have been interpreted as indicating increased motor simulation 
(Caetano et al., 2007; van Elk et al., 2008). Therefore, it is surprising 
that beta decreases were greater when the sentences referred to an 
animal’s action as opposed to a human’s, since presumably people 
can simulate human actions more easily and in greater detail than 
animal actions. It is difficult to interpret these data as clear evidence 
for or against embodied theories of semantics. For the present pur-
poses, this study provides further evidence that the motor cortex 
does not respond to action verbs indiscriminately. Whether it actu-
ally does respond depends upon the linguistic context the language 
is perceived in, as well as the task or intention of the perceiver.
Moody and Gennari (2010) showed that the amount of effort 
expressed in a sentence modulates activation levels in premotor 
cortex. “The delivery man is pushing the piano” led to stronger 
activation as compared to “The delivery man is pushing the chair,” 
which in turn led to stronger activation levels compared to the con-
trol condition “The delivery man has forgotten the piano.” Along 
similar lines, van Dam et al. (2010) found that part of inferior 
parietal cortex is sensitive to the implied specificity of single action 
verbs (e.g., “to wipe” versus “to clean”). These studies are further 
evidence for the context-specificity of activation in the motor sys-
tem upon reading action-related language.
Finally, few studies have looked at how sensori-motor areas 
are engaged in story comprehension, specifically when the story 
describes actions. Speer et al. (2009) for instance found that parts 
of motor cortex were specifically activated when participants 
read about physical actions, such as manipulations of objects. 
Interestingly, this was the case in the absence of an explicit task 
and the materials were not biased toward actions, making it less 
likely that explicit imagery was invoked by participants (see also 
Xu et al., 2005).
Thus in summary, the available evidence weighs against the 
view that merely perceiving a perception or action word necessar-
ily activates perceptuo-motor areas (Pulvermuller, 2005), while still 
showing that these areas can be activated with a surprising degree 
of automaticity, even during shallow language processing.
ProcEssing non-litEral languagE
According to theories of metaphorical mental representation, 
people understand abstract words and concepts, in part, by acti-
vating representations in more concrete domains, particularly the 
domains of space and motion (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). There 
is now abundant behavioral evidence that spatio-motor repre-
sentations contribute to people’s understanding of many abstract 
domains, including time (Boroditsky, 2000), preference (Casasanto, 
2009), goodness (Meier and Robinson, 2004), intimacy (Williams 
and Bargh, 2008), social dominance (Schubert, 2005), kinship 
(Enfield, 2005), musical pitch (Rusconi et al., 2006), and similarity 
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us that action verbs embedded in morphologically complex verbs 
and in frozen idioms do not activate motor areas (at least not on 
a timecourse relevant to early stages of language comprehension). 
But these studies do not bear on the question of whether metaphors 
with perceptuo-motor source domains are understood via activity 
in sensori-motor cortices.
A few cognitive neuroscience studies have tested comprehen-
sion of expressions which, according to the criteria of systematicity 
and productivity, should be processed via active mappings from 
metaphorical source domains. In one TMS study by Glenberg 
et al. (2008b), participants listened to sentences that described trans-
fer (movement) of a concrete object (“Andrea carries the pizza to 
you”) or sentences describing non-literal transfer (“Arthur presents 
the argument to you”). By hypothesis, “presenting” an argument is 
understood metaphorically, and uses the same motor circuits that 
support understanding literal transfer scenarios like “presenting a 
gift.” Consistent with the authors’ predictions, there was an increase 
of hand MEPs to transfer sentences compared to non-transfer con-
trol sentences (e.g., “You smell the pizza with Andrea”). Importantly, 
there was no difference between concrete transfer sentences and 
abstract transfer sentences. In a related study, Glenberg et al. (2008a) 
asked participants to move hundreds of beans either toward or away 
from their bodies before making sensibility judgments on concrete 
and abstract transfer sentences, responding with button presses that 
required movements toward or away from them. Participants were 
slower to judge transfer sentences when they described concrete 
or abstract “motion” in the same direction in which they had been 
moving beans, presumably because the same neural circuits that 
subserve physically transferring objects with the hands also support 
understanding transitive constructions in language.
Critics of embodied cognition often point to the existence of 
abstract concepts as prima facie evidence that some knowledge lies 
beyond the scope of theories that foreground modality-specific 
representation (e.g., Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). But this argu-
ment is not well justified. Metaphor theory is one example frame-
work in which to pursue testing roles for modality-specific neural 
activity in the representation of abstract concepts and language 
(see Barsalou, 2008 and Prinz, 2002 for alternatives). Here we have 
focused on activation of the motor system as a metaphorical source 
domain, but representations in abstract target domains could be 
neurocognitive simulations, as well. For example, thinking about 
emotions or understanding affective language could involve partial 
reenactments of emotional states, in the regions of the brain that 
give rise to emotional experiences, and there is indeed evidence to 
suggest that this is the case (e.g., Isenberg et al., 1999; Strange et al., 
2000; Herbert et al., 2009; Willems et al., 2010a). To the extent that 
abstract concepts are constituted by metaphorical source- and tar-
get-domain representations, modality-specific activity in sensory, 
motor, and interoceptive (e.g., affective) systems could contribute 
to the semantics of language about abstract things that people can 
never experience directly through perception or motor action.
summary and dirEctions for futurE rEsEarch
As is now evident from numerous studies, when people hear or 
read language about percepts and actions they reliably activate 
brain areas that also subserve perceiving and acting. Activation 
of sensori-motor cortices is specific: processing language about 
Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006) also used fMRI to compare premotor 
activity during literal and non-literal uses of action verbs. They 
found effector-specific premotor responses to phrases describ-
ing literal hand, foot, and mouth actions (“grasping the scissors,” 
“pressing the piano pedal,” “biting the peach”), but not to phrases 
that used action verbs non-literally (“handling the truth,” “chewing 
over the details,” “kicking off the year”; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). 
Similarly, in an fMRI study by Raposo et al. (2009), motor regions 
were activated when participants heard isolated action verbs 
(“kick”) and literal action sentences (“kick the ball”), but not 
when they heard action verbs used idiomatically (“kick the bucket,” 
meaning “to die”; Raposo et al., 2009). By contrast, Boulenger et al. 
(2008a) reported somatotopic activation in motor cortex when 
participants read idiomatic sentences like “He kicked the habit” 
(meaning “to quit”). However, this effect was only observed when 
neural activity was modeled 3 s after the end of each sentence, not 
when the neural response was modeled based on the presentation of 
the word that disambiguated literal from idiomatic sentences (e.g., 
“habit” in this example). The authors explain this late activation as 
resulting from the later metabolic changes allegedly associated with 
abstract sentences. However, as discussed in Section “Activation of 
Sensori-Motor Cortices: Functional or Epiphenomenal?”, this late 
engagement of motor areas could also be due to explicit mental 
imagery (e.g., of literal kicking) that occurs when experimental 
participants are given time to reflect on the stimuli.
So far, these studies comparing literal to non-literal uses of action 
verbs further demonstrate that the link between action language 
and motor cortex is context-sensitive. But what do they say about 
the metaphorical representation of abstract concepts and word 
meanings? In our view: very little. Metaphor theories differenti-
ate active metaphors (e.g., “grasp the idea”) from etymologically 
derived forms (e.g., “begreifen”) and frozen idioms (e.g., “kick the 
bucket”). Unlike etymological relics and idioms, active metaphors 
are systematic and productive (see Casasanto, 2009). “Grasping an 
idea” is part of a system of expressions that can indicate different 
levels of understanding, and the new variants of these expressions 
can be readily understood (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). When 
people are struggling with an idea they are “trying to grasp it” or 
“trying to get a hold of it.” When they understand something well 
they have a “firm grip” or a “good grasp.” When they are trying to 
forget an idea, they are “letting go of it.” By contrast, frozen idioms 
are neither systematic nor productive. “Kicking the bucket” means 
to die, but “kicking the cup” does not mean to merely get injured. 
Whereas metaphors are flexible, idioms a fragile; changing the way 
they are worded destroys their idiomatic meaning.
On most theories, only metaphors should be understood via 
activation of representations in the source domain (e.g., in case of 
“grasp the idea,” the source domain is literal grasping, and the target 
domain is the abstract notion of understanding). Frozen idioms and 
etymological roots should not necessarily activate source domain 
representations (Casasanto, 2009; cf. Gibbs, 2006). For the studies 
reviewed so far in this section, stimuli in the non-literal condition 
were partly (or entirely) composed of etymological derivations and 
frozen idioms. It is not surprising, therefore, that understanding 
them did not activate motor areas. The studies by Rueschemeyer 
et al. (2007), Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006), Raposo et al. (2009), and 
Boulenger et al. (2008a) provide valuable information; they tell 
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in sensori-motor activity during language processing, do not speak 
to the limits of this flexibility, or explore its consequences. For 
example, although several studies show that language-related RTs 
or MEPs are modulated when motor areas are perturbed using 
TMS, it remains to be determined in what ways people’s under-
standing of the linguistic stimuli changes as a consequence. When 
a perception or action word cues modality-specific cortical activity, 
does this result in a qualitatively different understanding of the 
word than when it does not? Is there a phenomenal difference for 
the comprehender? Does a representation of a word that includes 
modality-specific activity produce different behaviors (beyond 
affecting RTs in a laboratory task), or support different inferences 
than a representation that does not comprise any modality-specific 
activity? Such questions await further research.
Yet, on the basis of what has been shown so far, the literature on 
embodied language understanding calls for a reappraisal of what 
should be counted among the core neural systems involved in lan-
guage processing. At the end of the twentieth century, leading psy-
cholinguists drafted “blueprints” of the neurocognitive architecture 
for producing speech (Levelt, 1999) and for understanding spo-
ken language (Cutler and Clifton, 1999) and written text (Perfetti, 
1999), based on the initial decades of neurocognitive research on 
language. None of these blueprints suggests any important role for 
perceptuo-motor representations in the construction of linguis-
tic meaning, or predicts any activation in sensori-motor cortices 
corresponding to semantic processing (only during perception 
and production of words’ forms). Thus, the hypotheses pursued 
by embodiment theorists in the early twenty-first century consti-
tute a different way of thinking about language. The considerable 
amount of evidence for meaning-related activation of perceptuo-
motor systems suggests that the blueprints for the neurocognitive 
architecture of language may need to be redrawn.
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hues activates visual areas involved in discriminating chromatic 
as opposed to achromatic colors (Simmons et al., 2007); process-
ing language about a bodily action performed with one effector 
or another engages somatotopic representations in the motor 
system (Pulvermuller, 2005); the neural representation of action 
language reflects the ways that individuals tend to perform actions 
with their particular bodies (Willems et al., 2010b). Engagement of 
sensori-motor cortices has been shown to be rapid and automatic 
(Pulvermuller et al., 2005a), but also dependent on the linguistic 
and extra-linguistic context in which words occur.
Perceptuo-motor representations are not a sine qua non of lan-
guage processing, even for action words; rather, modality-specific 
representations are more likely to be activated in some contexts 
than in others (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Sato et al., 2008; Papeo 
et al., 2009). Yet, sensori-motor cortex activity appears to have 
some functional consequences for understanding language about 
actions, and even for understanding language about abstract ideas 
(Glenberg et al., 2008b). Thus, the evidence reviewed here satisfies 
the minimum requirements for a theory of “embodied semantics,” 
namely that (a) parts of our action and perception systems are 
involved in language understanding, and (b) this involvement is 
functional, constituting or contributing to the construction of 
meaning.
The flexibility with which sensori-motor representations are 
activated during language processing is consistent with a flexible 
view of conceptual representations, more broadly. The assump-
tion that conceptual representations are stable dates back at least 
to Plato’s Ideas (Copleston, 1946/1993) and has been the domi-
nant position – at least implicitly – for large part of the twentieth 
century. This has led to the general assumption that concepts are 
stable, with a specific pattern of brain activation being the repre-
sentation of the concept DOG (see Weiskopf, 2009 for discussion). 
This is an extreme position, and there is ample evidence against it 
(Barclay et al., 1974; Zwaan, 2004; Taylor and Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan 
and Kaschak, 2008; Zwaan et al., 2010). At the other extreme, it 
could be that context determines concepts and word meanings 
to such an extent that no neurocognitive representation is ever 
the same twice (Elman, 2004, 2009; Casasanto and Lupyan, under 
review). The studies reviewed here, while demonstrating  flexibility 
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